The Overlooked Concern with the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act by Hull, Katy
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 51 | Issue 6 Article 6
1-2000
The Overlooked Concern with the Uniform
Computer Information Transactions Act
Katy Hull
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Katy Hull, The Overlooked Concern with the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act, 51 Hastings L.J. 1391 (2000).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol51/iss6/6





Legislators, commentators, law professors, and organizations
such as the American Law Institute and the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws propose laws with a view to
improving society. However, in the case of the Uniform Computer
Information Transactions Act ("UCITA"),' those crafting the
legislation, though well-intentioned, may be leading states down the
wrong path. This possibility has not escaped the attention of
commentators, who express concern that the UCITA's treatment of
software licenses will remove consumer protections that purchasers
currently enjoy under the U.C.C. Article 2. However, as this Note
concludes, the real area of concern has often been overlooked.
Persons proposing new software licensing laws must carefully
consider how quickly computer technology changes. The UCITA or
any equivalent legislation must walk a fine line to provide sufficient
guidance and assurance for contracting parties yet not create overly
restrictive laws that will strangle online commerce in its infancy.
Simply put, state legislatures should not adopt well-intentioned but
misguided software licensing laws.
This Note will argue that technology will outgrow any laws based
* J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2000; B.A., University
of Oregon, 1993.
1. Prior drafts of the UCITA were proposed as Article 2B of the Uniform
Commercial Code [hereinafter U.C.C.]. In April 1999, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws [hereinafter NCCUSL] opted to promulgate a
code for computer information transactions as a stand alone uniform act rather than as a
part of the U.C.C. Many of the criticisms included in this Note were made with respect to
earlier drafts of Article 2B, but these criticisms remain relevant to the UCITA. Reference
to the "proposed U.C.C. 2B," will be made when more appropriate to the original
commentator's context.
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on specific concepts such as "mouse-clicks" and "e-mail," leaving us
in exactly the bind we are in now. Given the speed at which
technology is changing, case law and precedent will serve as better
guides to developing rules in this area. Legislators, judges, and
lawyers should find their own way through the issues, educating one
another and listening carefully to technology practitioners. There will
be a learning curve for all involved, as with any new body of law, but
eventually steps will be taken with increasing confidence. If
legislatures decide that new regulations, rather than reliance on
precedent, are needed, then the focus should be on the existence of a
contract, the understandings of the parties involved, and contractual
terms and conditions.
Part I of this Note will define relevant terminology and provide a
general background to the contractual issues underlying software
licensing. Part II will review the existing case law that addresses
software licensing issues. Part Ill will discuss arguments made in
favor the UCITA or any equivalent uniform law governing software
licensing. Part IV will examine criticisms of the UCITA by two
commentators and explain why these criticisms are invalid and indeed
overlook the true cause for concern with the UCITA.
I. What is a "Cfickwrap"?
"Clickwrap" refers to a particular form of license agreement in
which a window on a computer screen presents the computer user
(and potential licensee) with the terms to the agreement as well as
two buttons, reading (generally) "I accept" and "cancel" or "I do not
accept."'2 If the user clicks the mouse indicator on the button that
reads "cancel," the transaction stops and the display returns to the
original window. 3 If the user clicks "I accept," then the software
download or installation begins.4 This format allows for various ways
of ordering the information. For example, the licensor may require a
user to click on the "I accept" button for each "page" of the
agreement to ensure some interaction between the licensee and the
license terms.5 At the other extreme, the user may be referred (by
2. Zachary M. Harrison, Just Click Here: Article 2B's Failure to Guarantee Adequate
Manifestation of Assent in Click-Wrap Contracts, 8 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 907, 907-08 (1998). Mr. Harrison's Note examines the September 1997 draft of
the proposed U.C.C. 2B.
3. W. Scott Petty, E-Commerce Using Enforceable Click-Wrap Agreements, INTELL.
PROP. TODAY, Sept. 1998, at 22.
4. See id.
5. Fred M. Greguras, Click Commerce: Vendors of Software Over the Internet Must
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means of a link) to a new page containing the terms but which need
not necessarily be viewed or read before the "I accept" button is
pressed.6
The term "clickwrap" comes from the format's similarity to an
earlier type of software license called a "shrinkwrap." A shrinkwrap
license is presented to the purchaser as part of the packaging of
purchased software. Under this theory, the purchaser "agrees" to the
license agreement merely by breaking the seal of the packaging, or in
other words, opening the software.7
Both shrinkwrap and clickwrap licenses are contracts, or at least
are attempts at creating contracts, between the licensee and licensor.
They contain the classic requisite elements of a contract: the
exchange of promises (in the Restatement vocabulary)8 or offer and
acceptance (as expressed in traditional common law), and
consideration.9 One might also consider the exchange of a package of
software for money to be a sale of goods, falling under the Uniform
Commercial Code.'0 Indeed, an individual who goes to a store, picks
up a box containing software on compact disks or floppy disks, and
pays for it at the cash register probably does not consider the
transaction to be much different than buying a bag of sugar.
However, the purchaser of a bag of sugar owns it outright and
may use it to bake cookies to be re-sold at a school benefit, lend a cup
to a neighbor to be returned in kind later, or distribute it for free to a
church group. On the other hand, by the terms of the software
contract itself, the purchase of the disk package is, in reality, a
purchase of the license to use the software. The purchaser does not
necessarily receive all of the property rights that she might expect.
Typical restrictions on the licensee's rights include a prohibition on
copying or disclosure without the permission of the licensor and
limitations on various warranties such as merchantability or fitness
for a particular purpose." Additionally, licensors are generally
attempting to avoid the doctrine of first sale, which, under intellectual
Heed Intellectual Property Rules, SAN FRANCISCO DAILY J., Sept. 19,1998, at 5.
6. Gary H. Moore & J. David Hadden, On-Line Software Distribution: New Life For
'Shrinkwrap' Licenses?, COMPUTER LAW., Apr. 1996, at 3.
7. Carey R. Ramos & Joseph P. Verdon, Shrinkwrap and Click-On Licenses After
ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 13 COMPUTER LAW., Sept. 1996, at 1-2.
8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrs § 1 (1981).
9. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACrs §§ 3.1-.3 (1982).
10. U.C.C. § 2-102 (1990).
11. See Harrison, supra note 2, at 909-10. For a specific example of a software license
agreement, see Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255,257 n.2 (5th Cir. 1988).
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property law,12 would allow the purchaser of software to reverse
engineer the software and adapt it as she sees fit, and to install the
software on many different computer systems.
13
Most purchasers are unlikely to appreciate the subtle legal
differences between a license and an outright sale. But the rights of
the purchaser of software will depend heavily on whether the contract
is a license or a purchase of goods. Any confusion and
misunderstanding may also be compounded by the timing of the offer
and acceptance, which is far less straightforward when one contracts
electronically for a software license.
H. Case Law on Clickwrap and Shrinkwrap Licenses
Courts have had some difficulty in assessing these clickwrap and
shrinkwrap contracts, and there is little case law thus far addressing
the issue. What case law does exist is mostly indirect and somewhat
inconsistent. Twelve years ago, in Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software
Ltd.,14 the Fifth Circuit held a shrinkwrap license to be unenforceable
under contract law. Vault manufactured computer disks containing
software designed to prevent the unauthorized duplication of any
other software added to the disk at a later time (e.g. by a software
manufacturer). 15  Vault's software prevented a computer from
opening the other program without having the disk in the drive, so
that the program could not be used if it were copied from Vault's disk
to another disk, or to the hard drive.16 Vault included a license
agreement with each package of its disks which "specifically
prohibit[ed] the copying, modification, translation, decompilation or
disassembly of Vault's program."'1 7 The defendant, Quaid Software,
was accused of breaching that license agreement by reverse
engineering Vault's protective software program in order to build a
software "key" which would allow the duplication of programs on
Vault's disks.18 The court of appeals affirmed the district court's
12. There are interesting intellectual property issues with these software license
transactions as well, particularly the question of preemption by Federal copyright law.
These considerations are numerous and are beyond the scope of this Note. For an
excellent short discussion, see Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 96 n.7
(3d Cir. 1991).
13. Moore & Hadden, supra note 6, at 1.
14. 847 F.2d at 270.
15. See id. at 256-57.
16. See id.
17. Id. at 257.
18. See id. at 257-58.
[Vol. 51
UNIFORM COMPUTER INFORMATION
finding that the license was unenforceable because it was a contract of
adhesion.'9
Neither the Fifth Circuit nor the district court articulated its
reasoning for finding a contract of adhesion.20 However, arguments
that both shrinkwrap and clickwrap licenses are adhesion contracts
can be found in the scholarship of Farnsworth. Farnsworth identified
two dangers implicit in enforcement of standardized forms (including
mass-marketed license agreements) that relate to these transactions.21
The first problem occurs when the offeror of the terms has "the
advantage of time and expert advice in preparing [the contract]" as
compared to the offeree who "may have no real opportunity to read
the form and it is often not expected that he will do so."22 The second
problem arises when there is a great disparity in bargaining power
between the parties, "or, as is more often the case, there may be no
opportunity to bargain at all."23  The shrinkwrap and cickwrap
licenses fall perfectly under one of Farnsworth's examples, that of the
"take-it-or-leave-it proposition. ' 24 However, Farnsworth notes that:
courts steeped in traditional contract doctrine have not been
receptive to parties who sought to be relieved of their agreements
on the grounds of such imposition. Since the requirement of
bargain... is plainly met by simple adherence to a standard form,
the doctrine of consideration offers no ground for such relief. And
since the objective theory of contracts imposes no requirement that
a party intend or even understand the legal consequences of his
actions, a party is not entitled to relief merely because he neither
read the standard form nor considered the legal consequence of
adhering to it.25
In ProCD Inc. v. Zeidenberg,26 the Seventh Circuit directly
upheld the enforceability of shrinkwrap licenses and indirectly
indicated that clickwrap licenses are enforceable as well. In that case,
the court discussed a licensee's options if the contract terms of a
shrinkwrap license were unacceptable.27 Defendant Zeidenberg
purchased a software database of telephone listings, but broke the
19. See id. at 269-70.
20. It is disappointing that these courts did not articulate their reasoning because





25. Id. (citations omitted).
26. 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996).
27. See iL at 1450-53.
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terms of the license agreement by making the database information
available to the public over the Internet at a lower price than the
plaintiff was charging.28 Zeidenberg argued that he could not, by law,
have agreed to all the contract terms.29  The outer packaging
displayed only part of the contract, and at the time that he purchased
the software he had not seen, much less agreed to, the additional
terms which appeared on his computer screen once he began to install
the software for use.30 The district court held that the additional
terms were unenforceable as a matter of law because Zeidenberg
never assented to them.31 The court of appeals, however, determined
that the additional terms were enforceable because Zeidenberg had
the opportunity to return the software to the store and get his money
back if the additional terms were unacceptable and did not choose to
do so.32 This holding is in line with traditional contract law, which
considers acceptance to occur when a buyer does not "make an
effective rejection" after having "a reasonable opportunity to inspect"
the goods. 33
The appellate court's rationale behind its holding in ProCD
suggests that clickwrap licenses are even more likely to be upheld by
courts than shrinkwrap licenses. The court noted that the defendant
had read the license since, in fact, "[h]e had no choice,.., the
software splashed the license on the screen and would not let him
proceed without indicating acceptance." 34 Similarly, the format of
clickwrap licenses avoids the issue that arose in ProCD: terms added
after the actual purchase. The purchase literally cannot be completed
until after the terms (or access to them through a link to another
page) have been presented to the purchaser.
A more recent case, Hotmail Corp. v. Van $ Money Pie Inc.,35
further supports the proposition that courts are more likely to uphold
clickwrap licenses than shrinkwrap licenses. In Hotnail, the court
considered a clickwrap license 36 that outlined the terms of service
under which a licensee could use the Hotmail e-mail service.37 The
28. See id. at 1450.
29. See icL at 1452.
30. See id.
31. See ProCD Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640,655 (W.D. Wis. 1996).
32. See ProCD Inc., 86 F.3d at 1452-53.
33. U.C.C. § 2-606(1)(b) (2000).
34. ProCD Inc., 86 F.3d at 1452.
35. No. C 98-20064,1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10729, at *16 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16,1998).
36. A copy of Hotmail's agreement is available in paper format from the author.
37. 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10729, at *16-17.
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defendant had signed up online for several e-mail accounts with
Hotmail and, in creating each account, had been required to agree to
the terms outlined in Hotmail's service agreement.38 The terms to
which the defendant agreed prohibited sending unsolicited
commercial e-mails, or "spain," from the Hotmail service.39 The
court found that the evidence supported Hotmail's claim that the
defendant was "using Hotmail's services to facilitate sending spain
and/or pomography." 4  It concluded that Hotmail would "likely
prevail on its breach of contract claim" against Van Money,4 1
suggesting that clickwrap licenses are valid contracts, even if it did not
discuss the presentation or format of the specific license terms.
On the Hotmail account creation page existing as of this writing,
one "accept" button is presented above the terms of service
agreement, so that a licensee could accept the terms without scrolling
through them, and another such button is at the bottom of the page.42
As the courts become more accustomed to the technology involved,
they may very well begin to consider such issues as the particular
placement of the "accept" buttons. The common law of contracts
provides that a party will not be held to a term that is "not one that an
uninitiated reader ought reasonably to have understood to be a part
of that offer. '43 This idea was incorporated into the U.C.C., which
requires that any exclusion or modification of warranties must be
"conspicuous." 44  Since these clickwrap and shrinkwrap licenses
generally contain limitations of liability and warranty disclaimers, it is
no great stretch to require these disclaimers to be "conspicuous." 45
The techniques mentioned above, of creating a link to warranty
modifications on a separate page instead of on the same page as the
"accept" button, or even the placement of the button above the terms
so that the licensee is not required to scroll past the terms, are of
dubious validity under this view. Terms limiting liability or
disclaiming warranties on a separate page, apart from the acceptance
feature, are arguably not conspicuous.
Similarly, one might argue that, because of the requirement of





42. See supra, note 36.
43. FARNSWORTH, supra note 9, § 4.26.
44. U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (2000).
45. See ProCD Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640,654 (W.D. Wis. 1996).
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shrinkwrap licenses should in fact be unenforceable. The problem
with shrinkwrap licenses is that the license terms (as discussed in
section I) are "accepted" by the licensee's action of opening the
packaging. The acceptance of these terms comes after the contract
has already been formed, that is to say after the purchase of the
software. The Third Circuit found this to be the case in Step-Saver
Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech.
46
In Step-Saver, the plaintiff Step-Saver was in the business of
assembling hardware and software packages for the specific needs of
a group of users, particularly offices of doctors and lawyers.47 The
plaintiff had purchased software from The Software Link, Inc.
("TSL"), the co-defendant, to use as the operating system for these
packages.48 When the plaintiff's customers began complaining of
problems with the software, and the problems could not be resolved,
the plaintiff filed suit.49 TSL claimed that its shrinkwrap licenses
contained a disclaimer of warranties clause that applied against the
plaintiff, and the district court agreed.50
The court of appeals disagreed, noting that Step-Saver had
"never expressly agreed to the terms of the ... license, either as a
final expression of, or a modification to, the parties's [sic]
agreement."51  The court found that the contract formed by the
parties in their telephone discussions and subsequent actions "was
sufficiently definite without the terms provided by the [shrinkwrap]
license. '52  The court noted in particular that the parties had
previously agreed to the specific goods involved, the quantity, and the
price of the goods.53 The court concluded that "adding the disclaimer
of warranty and limitation of remedies provisions from the
[shrinkwrap] license would... substantially alter the distribution of
risk," and therefore would be material, so the "terms did not become
a part of the parties's [sic] agreement. '54 The court's basis for these
findings was U.C.C. section 2-207, which addresses additional terms
added to a contract by an acceptance or confirmation. 55 The court's
46. 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991).
47. See id. at 93.
48. See id. at 94.
49. See id.
50. See id. at 94-95.
51. Id. at 98.
52. Id. at 100.
53. See id.
54. Id. at 105.
55. See U.C.C. § 2-207 (2000).
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use of this provision, however, presumes that the U.C.C. applied at
all, which is not a foregone conclusion. The U.C.C. explicitly defines
its scope as applying to transactions in goods.56 The language of the
U.C.C. also suggests that it applies to the sale of goods, rather than
licenses or other non-proprietary transactions.57 The U.C.C. states
clearly that "[a] 'sale' consists in the passing of title from the seller to
the buyer for a price. '58 As explored above, the licensing of software
specifically and particularly avoids passing title to the purchaser.
Nevertheless, the courts have usually treated software licenses "as a
sale of goods governed by Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code."'59 One reporter, in explaining the problem, noted that "the
odd thing about Article 2... is that it has become the dumping
ground for software even though software is not a good and is more
often licensed than sold." 6
. The Argument for the UCITA or Some Equivalent
The software industry in the United States is growing rapidly and
has become a significant percentage of the economy. "[T]echnology's
share of the U.S. gross domestic product is growing, jumping from
6.4% in '93 to 8.2% in '98, says the Department of Commerce."' 61
Online sales of software alone measure in the billions.62 Online sales
of all types of goods are also rising dramatically. One analyst noted
that the 1997 figure of $3 billion in total online sales was expected to
increase to $7.1 billion in 1998.63 Another estimate claimed that e-
56. See id. § 2-102.
57. See id. § 2-106. See generally iL §§ 2-103, 2-106 (2000) (discussing "contract for
sale," "present sale," "sale," and "seller").
58. Id. § 2-106,2-401.
59. Moore & Hadden, supra note 6, at 2 (citing Advent Sys., Ltd. v. Unisys Corp., 925
F.2d 670 (3d Cir. 1991); Arizona Retail Sys., Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759
(D. Ariz. 1993)). See generally Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91 (3d
Cir. 1991) (agreeing that the U.C.C. is applicable to software transactions).
60. Holly K. Towle, Mapping the Law for E-Commerce Explosion; Revision of UCC
Article 2B Seeks to Blend Common Laws, Uncommon Applications, SAN FRANCISCO
DAILY J. SUPPLEMENT, Sept. 29, 1998, at 8.
61. Pete Barlas, Internet Is Weaving Its Way Throughout Society's Fabric, INVESTOR'S
Bus. DAILY, Jan. 19,1999, at AS.
62. Sales of pricier business software were valued at $2.3 billion in 1997, and game
software was worth a total of $1.3 billion. See Industry Snap Shot, INVESTOR'S Bus.
DAILY, Dec. 28, 1998, at B7. In 1998, software retailers' sales (including mail-orders)
jumped to $5.6 billion. See Paula Rooney, Software Sales Stay the Course, Despite Industry
Trends, COMPUTER RETAIL WK., Jan. 4,1999.
63. Matthew Nelson, 'Tis the Season for I-Commerce; Retailers Predict Big Boom in
Online Holiday Sales This Year, INFOWORLD, Nov. 30, 1998, at 14.
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commerce reached $6.6-7.2 billion in the last quarter alone of 1999.64
Online sales of software are expected to follow the trend. One survey
by the Software Publishers Association shows that "more than 18%
of software publishers sell and distribute full versions of their
software over the Web. ' 65 Another research group "projected that
84% of software publishers expect electronic software distribution to
account for about 50% of their sales by 2001."66 The number of
people using the Web in the U.S. in 1998 was over 56 million,67 and
one can only expect that number to grow.
As discussed in section II above, the courts are somewhat
inconsistent in handling the contract implications involved in these
hundreds of thousands of transactions. Arguably, a stable law of
contract is necessary to develop the industry to its fullest potential. In
addition, contract law, as explained by Farnsworth, benefits society as
a whole as well as the particular sellers and buyers involved:
From the perspective of society as a whole, the function of the law
of contracts might have been seen as furthering the general
economic good by encouraging parties to enter into such
productive transactions. From the perspective of the parties
themselves, the function might have been viewed more narrowly as
aiding them in planning for the future by protecting their
expectations. From either perspective, it was essential to provide a
general basis for the enforcement of promises that included purely
executory exchanges of promises. The development of such a
general basis closely paralleled the specialization of labor and the
development of competitive markets.
68
A settled, nation-wide set of laws governing software licenses
would help provide a solution to another issue-that of jurisdiction
over transactions where neither party may know where the other is
located. Clearly, some sort of predictable, reasonably consistent laws
across the country would encourage the growth of electronic
commerce. This is discussed briefly (in the context of third-party
verification of identity) by A. Michael Froomkin, who notes that a
licensor will need to know where the licensee lives because this "may
affect what law applies" to the transaction.69 The reverse would also
64. See Retailers Assess Performance After Intense Fourth Quarter, ELECTRONIC COM.
NEWS, Jan. 17,2000.
65. David Orenstein, Online Licenses Lack Standards and User Interes4 Developers
Team Up to Configure System, COMPUTERWORLD, Aug. 3,1998, at 8.
66. Id.
67. Barlas, supra note 61, at A8.
68. FARNSWORTH, supra note 9, § 1.3.
69. A. Michael Froomkin, Article 2B as Legal Software for Electronic Contracting-
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be true, as the licensee may also be concerned about what state's
contract law would be used in the event of a dispute. A set of
suggested standards would, if adopted by a majority of states, help
alleviate this concern. A broadly adopted set of laws would give
parties to a transaction more confidence in knowing what would be
the likely expectations of courts in other states, even if they do not
necessarily know the state residence of the other party to the
transaction. One federal court concluded that "applying a uniform
body of law on the wide range of commercial questions likely to arise
in software disputes would offer substantial benefits to parties,
particularly given the importance of software in commerce and the
advantages of uniformity. '70
Thus, the argument for a uniform body of law addressing the
enforcement of clickwrap licenses is based on three factors: the
importance of the software license industry to the U.S. economy, the
need for stability to insure the continued growth of this industry, and
the inconsistent application of the existing body of contract law by the
courts. The American Law Institute responded to this vacuum with
the proposed U.C.C. Article 2B, an amendment to the Uniform
Commercial Code. Ultimately, however, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL") officially
promulgated the proposed law, calling it the UCITA.71  The
NCCUSL decided to present its model legislation as an act that would
be separate and distinct from the Uniform Commercial Code.72 A
reporter's note in the original Article 2B gives a sense of the intended
scope of the UCITA, which includes
transactions involving creation or distribution of computer
software, multimedia or interactive products, computer data,
Internet, and online distribution of information. This leaves
unaffected the many transactions in the core businesses of other
information industries (e.g. print, motion picture, broadcast, sound
recordings) whose business practices in their core businesses differ
from those of the computer software, online, and data industries.
This article does not apply to print books, newspapers, or
Operating System or Trojan Horse?, 13 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 1023,1038 (1998).
70. Towle, supra note 60, at 8 (citing Advent Sys. Ltd. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670,
676 (3d Cir. 1991)).
71. See George L. Graff, The Evolution of the Uniform Computer Information
Transactions Act, SOFTWARE L. BULL., Nov. 1999, at 216.
72. See NCCUSL Press Release, NCCUSL to Promulgate Freestanding Uniform





IV.Problems with the UCITA and Possible Solutions
A. Warranty Coverage Problems
The UCITA has been subject to criticism that it will constrict
consumers' rights. One commentator, Michele Kane, has taken issue
with the UCITA's definition of a "computer program," complaining
that it "creates distinctions ... in a manner contrary to common
understanding and commercial practice, making the simple complex
and the statute difficult to discern and apply."74  The definition
distinguishes between the two functions of a computer program, the
operating instructions for the computer itself, called "computer
program," and the information which is communicated to a human
reader, which is called "informational content."75 The distinction is
important because the informational content, as defined by the
UCITA, is not covered by implied warranties.7 6 The potential harm is
that the consumers and attorneys "may be unable to determine the
extent to which warranties apply."77 Additionally, Kane warns, the
definitional problems will "affect the availability of, and limitations
on, remedies"78 because a purchaser is not entitled to consequential
damages stemming from losses caused by the informational content.79
Kane offers no specific suggestions for improvements to the proposed
amendment.
However, the UCITA does contain consumer protection clauses.
For example, in discussing its scope, the UCITA provides that "if this
[Act] or a term of a contract under this [Act] conflicts with a
consumer protection statute [or administrative rule], the consumer
73. U.C.C. § 2B-103 Reporter's Note 2 (Proposed Draft Dec. 1998) (noting that earlier
drafts had included these "other information industries," and those differing interests
nearly stopped the entire 2B project. The project had to be narrowed to apply only to
software and information contracts.). See also Brenda Sandburg, Commercial Code
Upgrade May Fall Apart, THE RECORDER, Sept. 28,1998, at 1.
74. Michele C. Kane, When Is a Computer Program Not a Computer Program? The
Perplexing World Created by Proposed U.C.C. Article 2B, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1013,
1013 (1998).
75. See UNIF. COMPUTER INFO. TRANSACIONS Acr § 102(a)(12), (a)(37) (2000)
(defining, respectively, "computer program" and "informational content").
76. See Kane, supra note 74, at 1017-18.
77. Id. at 1017.




protection statute [or rule] governs."8 0 The official comment to this
section further explains that "the Act does not alter state consumer
protection statutes" and notes that in fact "the Act does contain
numerous consumer protections."8'
Furthermore, the warranty disclaimer requirements of the
UCITA are comparable to those in U.C.C. Article 2, sometimes
explicitly so. For example, language which is sufficient to disclaim or
modify warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular
purpose under Article 2 will also be sufficient under the UCITA.82 In
the case of mass-market transactions (involving, for example,
clickwrap or shrinkwrap licenses), the UCITA requires any
modification or disclaimer of an implied warranty to be
conspicuous, 83 which assures "that the party against which the
disclaimer operates has fair notice of its terms." 84 The terms of the
UCITA were deliberately kept as close to Article 2 as possible, in
order to "avoid requiring parties to make a priori decisions about
Article 2B or Article 2... coverage particularly when 'mixed'
transactions will be increasingly common. 8 5 In other words, software
is frequently sold with hardware, which is covered by Article 2. The
writers of UCITA are trying to avoid the confusion that would result
from different standards covering different pieces of the same
transaction. Therefore, they designed the UCITA to work in
harmony with Article 2 in order to avoid differing standards between
the two for warranty terms and consumer protections.
B. Acceptance Problems
Another commentator, Zachary Harrison, identifies four distinct
problems with clickwrap licenses which are not addressed by the
UCITA: mistake and lack of psychological commitment by the
purchaser, unclear timing of manifestations of assent, potential lack
of legal capacity of the purchaser, and state statutes requiring
signatures on certain transactions.8
6
(1) Lack of Genuine Commitment
The first problem, mistake or lack of psychological commitment,
80. § 105(c).
81. Id. § 105 cmt. 5.
82. See id. § 406(b)(4).
83. See id § 406(b)(1)(A), (b)(2), (b)(3).
84. lId § 406 cmt. 4.
85. U.C.C. § 2B-406 Reporter's Note 4(f) (Proposed Draft Dec. 1998).
86. Harrison, supra note 2, at 939-42.
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refers to the possibility of an individual clicking on an "I accept"
button to accept the terms of an agreement without realizing what
they have done, or without considering the ramifications.87 The
problem arises from the ease with which a transaction can be
completed - one click of a button, literally, with no requirement that
the terms actually be read.88 The technology itself, claims the author,
is the problem, because "the consumer's lack of subjective intent to
agree to the license agreement is hidden behind her computer
interface." 89
The UCITA addresses this possibility of mistake or lack or
intent. Section 112 outlines the requirements for a manifestation of
assent, emphasizing the importance of knowing assent to a term 0
The official draft comment to the section gives a specific three-step
analysis to determine assent. The purchaser must have had
knowledge of the agreement term or an opportunity to review it,91
and must sign the contract (or in the language of the UCITA,
"authenticate," giving the digital equivalent of a signature) "with
reason to know that the conduct indicates assent," 92 and the signature
or authentication must be attributable to the purchaser.93 These
requirements negate the possibility of a mistaken assent to a contract,
or at the very least provide the unwitting purchaser with a strong
defense to contract claims.
(2) Timing of Assent
The second problem identified by Harrison is the issue of the
timing of the purchaser's assent to the contract terms. Harrison
concedes that "[w]ith respect to a license provided after acceptance,
section 2B-213 [and now, the UCITA] does provide for a refund if the
license is refused."94 The problem Harrison is concerned with is
apparently the feasibility of returning the software. He points out
that "the essential question is whether consumers are truly able to
withdraw their consent to objectionable click-wrap terms based on
the current prevailing practices of Internet service providers." 95 The
87. See id. at 939-40.
88. See id.
89. Id. at 940.
90. See UNIF. COMPUTER INFO. TRANSACrIONS Acr § 112 (2000).
91. See id. cmt. 2.
92. Id.
93. See id.
94. Harrison, supra note 2, at 940.
95. Id. at 940-41.
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obstacle to returning the software is the combination of billing
practices of some Internet service providers, who will only allow a
contract to be terminated at the end of a monthly billing cycle, and
the fact that many service providers do not have sufficient customer
assistance, so that a consumer's credit card is billed for the time spent
waiting on the phone for a response.96
This concern, however, is only valid for contracts with a monthly
payment requirement, rather than for a one-time money-for-software
exchange. Also, neither part of this concern is really a problem with
the UCITA, but instead a problem with either the equipment (limited
phone lines) or the practices and policies (billing practices,
insufficient customer service employees, etc.) of a particular business.
Consumers will, over time, likely move away from providers whose
business practices displease them, or in some cases they will bring
lawsuits to attempt to force the providers to solve the equipment and
business practices problems. For example, America Online, an
Internet Service Provider, was the defendant in at least two class-
action lawsuits in which its customers complained of their lack of
access to the networks caused by a change in the billing practices. 97
Neither suit involved UCITA issues, and the UCITA cannot be
expected to solve problems resulting from an Internet service
provider's equipment.
(3) Lack of Capacity to Assent
The third problem Harrison addressed is the potential
acceptance of a license contract by a party lacking legal capacity, such
as a child or person who is otherwise incompetent.98 This problem is
in some ways similar to his first concern about mistake, in that the
technology contributes to the problem. Since the parties have no
face-to-face dealings, and the purchaser merely clicks a button to
indicate acceptance of the contract terms, the licensor is unable to
know if the licensee is a child. This concern also raises a consumer
protection issue: may the unknowing parent of an Internet-savvy
child be held liable for the child's online contracts. 99 Writing about an
earlier draft of U.C.C. Article 2B, Harrison insists that "[b]ased on
children's tremendous access [to the] Internet, the U.C.C. drafting
96. See id.
97. See Crosby v. America Online, 967 F. Supp. 257, 265 (N.D. Ohio 1997); America
Online v. Williams, 958 S.W. 2d 268 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997).




committee must address this problem in future drafts."'100 Still, even
in contracts involving traditional goods that fall within the scope of
the U.C.C., the common law is the source of the solution to the
disaffirmance of a contract by a minor, rather than the U.C.C.
The common law provides that minors' contracts are "voidable"
at the election of the minor.0 1 Farnsworth further explains that
"[t]he power of avoidance is personal to the minor and can be
exercised only by the minor himself or... in some instances [by] his
parent or other guardian."'02 If the minor does choose to disaffirm
the contract, she will be required to return the remaining portion of
the goods she received.') 3 In the context of a software license, a
minor may accomplish essentially the same result by deleting the
software from a computer such that it may no longer be used. The
same common-law consumer protections would apply to software as
to other more tangible goods.
Even if software vendors were to begin requiring purchasers to
click a button reading "I accept, and declare that I am over the age of
18 and competent to enter into a contract," consumer protections
would still be in place. For instance, some states refuse to permit a
minor who has misrepresented her age to disaffirm a contract. 0 4
However, even the states that embrace this exception to the general
rule do not apply it to instances of "a printed affirmation of majority
on a standard form supplied by the other party."'0 5 So the act of the
minor clicking a button which asserts competency to enter into a
contract will not remove the consumer protections which allow the
minor to disaffirm.
(4) Conflicts in Proof of Assent
The last problem examined by Harrison is the possible conflict
between state statutes which require signatures on certain types of
contracts, and the UCITA's concept of "authentication," which is a
much broader method of indicating an intent to be bound by the
terms of a contract. The UCITA says that "[a] person manifests
assent to a record or term if the person. .. authenticates the record or
100. Id.
101. FARNSWORTH, supra note 9, § 4.4.
102. Id.
103. See id. § 4.5.
104. See id. These states view the minor's conduct as a tort since it induces reliance and




term."106 According to the UCITA, "to authenticate" is "to sign or,
with the intent to sign a record, otherwise to execute or adopt an
electronic symbol, sound, message, or process referring to, attached
to, included in, or logically associated or linked with, that record.107
Clearly the UCITA covers a wide range of possible modes of
assent and thus sets the stage for possible conflicts with state laws
regarding signatures. However, as Harrison concedes, 108 and as is
noted above, another section of the UCITA cedes priority to state
consumer protection laws if there is a conflict.109 So at least in regard
to consumer protections, no real issue exists here.
C. Some Proposed Solutions
Harrison has proposed solutions to some of the issues presented.
To avoid the problem of a lack of actual commitment on the part of
the licensee/purchaser, Harrison essentially wants a higher degree of
interaction between the licensee and the technological acceptance of
the terms. 10 The suggested means for this are:
to require the consumer to type in an affirmative statement, such as
"I assent to the terms of the license agreement," in order to signify
binding assent .... Another possibility would be for the click-wrap
page to have a clause that says "in order to signify that you agree to
be bound by the foregoing terms, please type in the following
code" .... [T]hose positive acts would be a much clearer form of
acceptance than the buyer refraining from returning the software as
suggested by the Seventh Circuit in ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg. 11
Harrison also suggests that the UCITA "should encourage
clickwrap licensors to take steps to make it technologically impossible
for a user to access the material offered by a site unless the consumer
has indicated assent to the license before the software is
downloaded. 112 Such steps would solve the potential concern of a
licensor/seller that a consumer will buy the software, copy it to a
computer, discover a license term to which she does not agree, and
return a copy of the software to the seller without removing the
106. UNIF. COMPUTER INFO. TRANSACrIONS Acr § 112(a)(1) (2000).
107. 1& § 102(a)(6).
108. See Harrison, supra note 2, at 942.
109. See § 105(c), (d) (2000). Cf § 105(b) (giving courts explicit permission to override
the UCITA in favor of conflicting public policy).
110. See Harrison, supra note 2, at 942-44.
111. Id. at 944.
112. Id. at 944-45.
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software from her own computer-or perhaps return the copy and yet
keep the software regardless of her acceptance of the license terms.
1 3
The primary problem with the proposed solutions is that they
may aggravate rather than cure the difficulties in the law that led to
the need for the UCITA in the first place. The ultimate rationale for
the adoption of the UCITA is that the technology evolved faster than
the law, and this led to uncertainty about what laws covered
transactions involving the new technologies." 4 As attorney Carol
Kunze explained the problem in her online commentary,
[t]he U.S. economy has changed dramatically since the 1950's
when... the Uniform Commercial Code was initially adopted. As
befitted a goods-based economy, the UCC focused on the sale of
tangible goods. Since that time we have shifted from a goods to a
service-based economy.... The UCC does not address the
licensing of intangible goods-the most prevalent form of
commercial software transaction today. Nor does it apply to
service contracts such as software development, maintenance, and
access contracts. 11
5
Another commentator who is quite well-known among the
online community, John Perry Barlow, dramatically announced that
"[n]otions of property, value, ownership, and the nature of wealth
itself are changing more fundamentally than at any time since the
Sumerians first poked cuneiform into wet clay and called it stored
grain." 116  Harrison's suggested solutions include specific
requirements such as technology to force a higher degree of
interaction between the licensee and the contract terms and
technology which forced the licensee to view all the terms before
assent could take place. 117 However, any law which binds itself to
concepts so tightly intertwined with existing technology will become
outdated and will end up constricting growth within a very short time
span, just as the current technology industry has outgrown the law of
the original Uniform Commercial Code. Furthermore, as indicated
113. See id. at 945.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 55-60. See also Carol Kunze, The 2BGuide
(visited Sept. 15, 2000) <http://www.2Bguide.comfbkgd.html> [hereinafter Kunze,
2BGuide]; Carol Kunze, UCITA Online (visited Oct. 19, 2000)
<http://www.ucitaonline.com>.
115. Kunze, 2BGuide, supra note 114.
116. John Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas: Everything You Know about
Intellectual Property Is Wrong, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: MORAL, LEGAL, AND
INTERNATIONAL DILEMMAS 349,353 (Adam D. Moore ed., 1997).
117. See supra text accompanying notes 110-112.
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above,118 the problems with consumer protections discussed by
various commentators are sufficiently addressed by the UCITA and
the common law of contracts. Efforts should now be focused on
creating a law which will not be outgrown anytime soon in the face of
explosively evolving technology and business models.
This obviously will not be an easy task. Professor A. Michael
Froomkin has explained that "[o]ne reason why Article 2B [and the
UCITA have] proven to be so difficult to get right is that the
information technologies to which it would apply are themselves in a
state of ferment.""19 Froomkin goes even further, suggesting that
"adding in the task of defining distinct rules applicable to all
electronic contracts of sale, or even just those ... licensing
information, may make it impossible"1 20 to write a truly effective
UCITA.
D. The Real Problem with the UCITA
In all, the UCITA debate is remarkably thoughtful, and yet, as in
most discussions about information policy, participants generally
employ language about "information," the "network," and a "digital
economy" as though these terms refer to something already well
understood. On the contrary, network technology is still evolving
rapidly, commercial software is often experimental, and the social and
economic formations for which we use labels like "digital economy"
are in very early stages of their development. Professor Peter Lyman,
agreeing with Froomkin, explains that "[t]he danger is that a legal
regime intended to strengthen the digital economy could inhibit its
growth and resiliency in the global economy if it does not fully
understand its structures, dynamics, and needs. ' 121
Barlow sees the problem as a cultural, or social, clash. In
discussing the problem of policing intellectual property rights on the
Internet, he explains the problem in a way that contains a warning
concerning the future of online contract law:
Humans have not inhabited cyberspace long enough or in sufficient
diversity to have developed a Social Contract that conforms to the
strange new conditions of that world.... To the extent that law and
established social practice exists in this area, they are already in
118. See supra text accompanying notes 77-109.
119. Froomkin, supra note 69, at 1026.
120. Id.
121. Peter Lyman, The Article 2B Debate and the Sociology of the Information Age, 13
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1063,1067-68 (1998).
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dangerous disagreement.... Part of the widespread disregard for
commercial software copyrights stems from a legislative failure to
understand the conditions into which it was inserted. To assume
that systems of law based in the physical world will serve in an
environment as fundamentally different as cyberspace is a folly for
which everyone doing business in the future will pay.'2 2
States contemplating adoption of the UCITA, or any similarly-
intended legislation, must heed this warning.
Barlow's statements bring up another consideration missed by
critics of the UCITA's approach to consumer protection standards:
the Internet has and will continue to fundamentally change business
models by rendering geography less relevant to consumer choices.
Someone living in a small town in Kansas no longer needs to choose
between the two programs offered at her local Radio Shack (and
their corresponding license terms), but may buy software from New
York, Hong Kong, or Israel, giving the license terms more weight in
the purchase decision than the location of the vendor. This
development will ultimately lead to a greater equality among vendors
since the product, and not the convenience, will become the primary
concern. As noted by Lyman, "access to information will shift market
power from the producer to the consumer, and... therefore the key
to business success in the information age will be the use of virtual
community technology to create customer loyalty."'123 License terms
will be one consideration in a purchase decision, and purchasers will
have hundreds of software options-and can vote with their dollars if
terms are unacceptable. Put succinctly by Judge Easterbrook of the
Seventh Circuit, "[c]ompetition among vendors, not judicial revision
of a package's contents, is how consumers are protected in a market
economy."' 24
The last consideration, but certainly not the least, is that any new
restrictive laws on online commerce will conflict with current U.S.
government policy. With two general exceptions, online pornography
and the exportation of cryptography, the U.S. government has used a
laissez-faire approach to laws and policies controlling online
commerce. Even those two exceptions are not ironclad. Congress'
initial attempt to outlaw online pornography, the Communications
Decency Act of 1996, was struck down as an unconstitutional
limitation of free speech rights in Reno v. American Civil Liberties
122. Barlow, supra note 116, at 355-56.
123. Lyman, supra note 121, at 1080 (citing JOHN HAGEL III & ARTHUR ARMSTRONG,
NETGAIN: EXPANDING MARKETS THROUGH VIRTUAL COMMUNmES 187 (1997)).
124. ProCD Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447,1453 (7th Cir. 1996).
[Vol. 51
UNIFORM COMPUTER INFORMATION
Union.125 Furthermore, the government has begun to consider easing
the ban on the exportation of cryptography programs. A House
subcommittee recently passed legislation to relax export controls. 2 6
The U.S. Commerce Department has also issued more relaxed
rules.127
Regarding electronic commerce more generally, the government
has taken a decidedly hands-off approach. The Internet Tax
Freedom Act, passed in October of 1998, put a three-year
moratorium on any taxation of Internet commerce.128 The leading
candidates in the U.S. Presidential Election of 2000 support at least a
further temporary moratorium, and some even favor a permanent
ban on Internet taxes. 129  A recently issued report from the
Commerce Department also makes the point more generally. The
report states that "[g]overnments must allow electronic commerce to
grow up in an environment driven by markets, not burdened with
extensive regulation, taxation, or censorship. While government
actions will not stop the growth of electronic commerce, if they are
too intrusive, progress can be substantially impeded.' 130 The report
mandates that "[t]he private sector and government, working
together, must address these problems in ways that make the Internet
a safe environment while not impeding its commercial
development."131
V. Conclusion
The Internet plays a significant role in the newly emerging
economy. Online purchases of software are particularly important to
that economy and appropriate legal protections should be afforded to
both licensors and licensees. However, these protections must not be
in the form of laws that constrict economic growth. The
commentators who worry about the lack of consumer protections
125. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997). See also ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d
473 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (striking down Congress' second attempt, the Child Online Protection
Act).
126. H.R. 850,106th Cong. (1999).
127. U.S. Issues Relaxed Export Limits on Encryption, NAT'L POST, Dec. 31, 1998, at
D02.
128. Internet Tax Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, Title XI [H.R. 4328] (1998); see
also David E. Hardesty, Internet Tax Freedom Act, THE TAX ADVISER, Jan. 1999, at 53.
129. See Carolyn Lochhead, Candidates Bow at High Tech's Altar, S.F. CHRON., Jan.
20,2000, at Al.
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afforded by the UCITA are focusing on the wrong issue-the
protections are sufficient, the new focus must be on not smothering
online commerce with restrictive laws. Instead, legislators, judges,
lawyers, and other practitioners would do better to look to previous
case law and precedent in finding their way. Any new laws or
regulations in this area must focus on the concept of a contract, not
on the technical workings of its creation, or the laws will become as
quickly outdated as the technology.
